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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jordan Marie Shaver appeals from the district court’s order summarily 
dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal Shaver argues the 
district court failed to give proper notice before it summarily dismissed her 
“disproportionate sentence post-conviction claim.”   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 Shaver pled guilty to murder in the second degree.  (R., p. 218.)  The 
district court sentenced Shaver to life with 20 years fixed.  (Id.)  Shaver filed an 
I.C.R. 35 Motion, which the district court denied.  (R., p. 56.)  Shaver appealed.  
(R., pp. 56-57.)  The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence 
and the order denying her Rule 35 Motion.  (Id.)   
Shaver filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief.  (R., pp. 7-
13.)  Shaver alleged three grounds for relief: 
(a) Public Defender inadequately defended me.  I was 
persuaded to plead guilty by threats of more charges.  
 
(b) Guilty plea was entered due to promises that were not kept.  
 
(c) Sentence is disproportionate for being my 1st felony 
conviction with my history of mental health problems.   
 
(R., p. 8.)   
In support of her claims Shaver alleged that her counsel failed to inform 
her that, despite her mental health problems, she could still receive a life 
sentence, promised a manslaughter charge with a 15 year maximum sentence, 
and “did not properly voice [her] mental state or try for a lesser sentence 
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because of it.”  (R., p. 9.)  In her accompanying affidavit, Shaver stated that she 
did not feel she was properly represented because her trial counsel failed to 
bring her state of mental health to the court’s attention, and led her to believe 
that the district court would be lenient because of her mental health problems.  
(R., p .12.)   
The state filed an answer.  (R., pp. 31-91.)  The state denied Shaver’s 
allegations and specifically alleged that Shaver’s disproportionate sentence claim 
was “barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it was the subject of a prior 
Rule 35 motion and an appeal.”  (R., p. 32.) 
The state filed a motion for summary disposition and brief in support of 
the motion.  (R., pp. 94-161.)  The state’s motion incorporated its answer. 
(R., p. 95 (“The Brief in Support and the State’s Answer are incorporated 
herein.”).  The state argued that, based upon the pleadings, including the 
answer, Shaver failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding her 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and that Shaver sought relief which 
cannot be granted in post-conviction. (R., p. 94.)  The state also argued that the 
relief requested by Shaver “would be both ineffective for addressing Petitioner’s 
concerns and are [sic] inappropriate results for a UPCPA action.”  (R., p. 101.)   
The district court appointed counsel to represent Shaver.  (R., p. 164.)  
Shaver filed a memorandum in opposition to the State’s motion for summary 
disposition.  (R., pp. 178-189.)  Shaver argued that her counsel was ineffective at 
sentencing because trial counsel made “nothing more than a cursory mention of 
the Petitioner’s drug use and mental illness.”  (R., pp. 184-187.)  The district 
 3 
court held a hearing on the state’s motion, but the parties agreed to waive oral 
argument.  (R., p. 190.)   
The district court entered a memorandum decision and order dismissing 
Shaver’s post-conviction claims.  (R., pp. 218-225.)  Relevant to this appeal, the 
district court found that Shaver’s disproportionate sentence claim was barred by 
res judicata because Shaver had already filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion, 
the denial of which was affirmed on appeal.  (See R., pp. 222-223.)  The district 
court entered judgment dismissing Shaver’s post-conviction petition. 
(R., pp. 226, 244.)  Shaver filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp. 230-234, 245-




Shaver states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Ms. Shaver’s 
disproportionate sentence post-conviction claim, because the 
district court did not give any notice of the reasons why that claim 
was ultimately dismissed? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Shaver failed to show the district court erred by summarily dismissing 




Shaver Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing 
Her Disproportionate Sentence Post Conviction Claim 
 
A. Introduction 
 Shaver argues on appeal that she had inadequate notice regarding the 
reasons the district court dismissed her disproportionate sentence claim because 
those reasons were not included in the state’s motion for summary dismissal.  
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-11.)  Shaver is incorrect.  The state’s motion for 
summary dismissal incorporated the reasons ultimately relied upon by the district 
court when it dismissed her disproportionate sentence claim.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner’s favor, would require relief to be granted.  
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992).  The 
court freely reviews the district court’s application of the law.  Id. at 434, 835 P.2d 
at 669.  The court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory 
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions 
of law.  Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). 
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C. The State’s Motion For Summary Disposition Incorporated The Answer 
And Thus Gave Shaver Notice That Her Disproportionate Sentence Claim 
Was Subject To Dismissal Because It Was Barred By Res Judicata 
 
Shaver argues the district court did not give proper notice of the reasons 
why her disproportionate sentence post-conviction claim was dismissed.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.)  Specifically, Shaver argues the district court’s 
reasons for dismissing Shaver’s claim differed from the reasons contained in the 
State’s motion for summary dismissal.  (Id.)  Shaver is incorrect.  The state’s 
motion for summary dismissal incorporated the reasons ultimately relied upon by 
the district court’s summary dismissal.    
“Idaho Code § 19-4906 permits a court to rule summarily on applications 
for post-conviction relief.”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 
803 (2007).  Where the district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction 
petition on its own initiative, a petitioner is entitled to notice of the basis for the 
dismissal, and 20 days to respond.  I.C. § 19-4906(b).  However, where the 
district court grants a party’s motion for summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-
4906(c), the motion itself serves as the notice, and no additional notice from the 
court of the dismissal is necessary.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 523-524, 164 P.3d 
at 803-804 (citing Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 
798 (1995)); see also Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517, 211 P.3d 123, 126 
(Ct. App. 2009).  Under subsection (c), the court may grant a motion for 
summary disposition “when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any 
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affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  I.C. § 19-4906(c). 
Here, the district court found that Shaver’s disproportionate sentence 
claim was barred by res judicata because she previously filed an Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 Motion, the denial of which was affirmed on appeal.  (See R., pp. 222-
223.)  This reasoning was incorporated into the state’s motion for summary 
dismissal.   
The state filed a Motion for Summary Disposition which incorporated its 
answer.  (R., p. 95 (“The Brief in Support and the State’s Answer are 
incorporated herein.”).)  The state’s answer specifically alleged that Shaver’s 
disproportionate sentence claim was “barred by the doctrine of res judicata 
because it was the subject of a prior Rule 35 motion and an appeal.”  (R., p. 32.) 
7. (a)-(c) All denied.  Items (a) and (b) were address and 
specifically denied by the Defendant in her Guilty Plea Advisory 
Form. Exhibit C.  Furthermore, specifically as to (c), this allegation 
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it was the subject 
of a prior Rule 35 motion and an appeal and the litigation of this 
matter concluded there.  The appeal is identified in the Petition, 
and is Docket No. 42708.  The Respondent claims this as an 
affirmative defense.  Exhibit D: 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 339, 
Docket No. 42078. 
 
(R., p. 32.)  This is the same rationale utilized by the district court in its 
Memorandum Decision and Order.  (See R., pp. 222-223.)   
A combination of an answer and a motion for summary dismissal was 
found to provide sufficient notice in Workman v. State, 144 Idaho at 523-524, 
164 P.3d at 803-804.  The Idaho Supreme Court explained: 
While we conclude the State’s answer and motion to dismiss in this 
case were technically sufficient under I.C. § 19-4906(c) and 
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Saykhamchone, we reiterate our direction in Saykhamchone that 
the preferable practice is: (1) to file a motion separate from the 
answer, (2) to identify that motion as a motion for summary 
disposition, not a motion to dismiss, and (3) to use the language of 
I.C. 19-4906(c) and cite that specific statutory provision in support 
of the motion for summary disposition. It should be absolutely clear 
to a defendant that the State is not just responding to a petition but 
is seeking summary disposition without an evidentiary hearing and 
without further notice to the defendant. Under the particular 
circumstances of this case, the State’s objective was clear and no 
advance notice by the district court was required before it 
summarily dismissed Workman’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Id. at 524, 164 P.3d at 804.  Here, the state filed an answer and a motion for 
summary dismissal with the clear objective of seeking the dismissal of Shaver’s 
petition.  (See R., pp. 31-91, 94-161.)  By specifically incorporating its Answer in 
its motion, the state put Shaver on notice that her disproportionate sentence 
claim was subject to dismissal because it was barred by res judicata. 
Shaver had notice regarding the reasons for dismissal and the district 
court properly granted summary dismissal under Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) 
because it appeared from the pleadings that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact and the state was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   
 
D. In The Alternative, The Disproportionate Sentence Claim Was Part Of 
Shaver’s Claim Regarding Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel At 
Sentencing  
 
It is not clear whether Shaver intended her disproportionate sentence 
claim to be an independent claim or whether the claim was part of her ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.  In her affidavit in support of her petition, Shaver 
claimed her trial counsel failed to defend her and misled her into believing she 
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would get a lesser sentence because of her mental health issues.  (R., p. 12.)  
She alleged:  
I do not feel I was properly represented in the court proceedings 
where I was convicted and sentenced on 1 count of Murder II.  My 
public defender Tony Geddes did not properly defend me in my 
case.  He failed to bring attention to the fact that I am not healthy in 
my mental state.  He lead [sic] me to believe there would be 
leniency on me because of my mental state and allowed me to 
believe that if I pled guilty to Murder II I would then receive a lesser 
sentence of 10 + life instead of 20 + life.  Had I been properly 
educated that my mental health would not play a role in my 
sentencing, I would never have taken a guilty plea.  I truly was lead 
[sic] to believe I would the lesser sentence of 10 fixed-life on 
parole.  
 
(R., p. 12.)  Other than the statement, “Sentence is disproportionate for being my 
1st felony conviction with my history of mental health problems,” Shaver’s petition 
and accompanying affidavit does not reference or explain how her sentence was 
disproportionate.  Instead, her petition and affidavit focus on how she believed 
her counsel was ineffective in advising her regarding her guilty plea and arguing 
her mental health problems at sentencing.  (See R., pp. 7-13.)     
The parties also appeared to interpret the disproportionate sentence issue 
as part of Shaver’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The state’s motion 
for summary dismissal argues that “Petitioner’s third claim is that the ‘[s]entence 
is disproportionate for being my 1st felony conviction with my history of mental 
health problems.’  This claim seems to be the gravamen of Petitioner’s concern, 
since it is further explained in the supporting affidavit.”  (R., p. 100.)  The state 
went on to argue that Shaver’s mental health issues were very clearly before the 
district court at sentencing and there was a mental health evaluation and 
“voluminous” records regarding Shaver’s mental health issues.  (R., p. 101.)  In 
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response to the state’s motion for summary dismissal, Shaver argued that her 
counsel was ineffective at sentencing because trial counsel presented “nothing 
more than a cursory mention of the Petitioner’s drug use and mental illness.”  
(R., pp. 184-187.)   
The district court’s memorandum decision and order specifically 
addressed Shaver’s allegations regarding her counsel’s arguments during 
sentencing and found she failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.  (See 
R., pp. 222-224.)  Thus, in the alternative, if the disproportionate sentence issue 
was actually part of Shaver’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, then 
Shaver was given adequate notice by the state’s motion for summary dismissal 
and the district court did not err.   
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s 
summary dismissal of Shaver’s post-conviction petition.   
 DATED this 2nd day of March, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Ted S. Tollefson_______ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
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